The report that accompanied the rankings identified five gaps companies should address (Lezhnev and Hellmuth August 2012). It also included a sizable section on other industries that use 3TGs, framing these industries as generally inactive but rewarding several companies that have taken steps on conflict minerals. Again, newspapers and other major media outlets reported on the rankings (Reuters 15 August 2012; Meger 31 August 2012; Kaufman 12 January 2016; Miller 16 August 2012).
Enough has not produced an electronics company ranking since 2012. However, in its reports it continues to reward companies for showing leadership (Bafilemba, Mueller, and Lezhnev June 2014; Dranginis 24 November 2014; Hall and Lezhnev 11 November 2013).
Enough bolstered its credibility by producing reports that drew on site visits and interviews. These reports detailed human rights abuses in DRC (Dranginis 21 January 2015; Lezhnev 27 October 2016), the connection between minerals trading and the conflict (Lezhnev and Sullivan May 2011; Enough Project October 2012; de Koning and the Enough Project October 2013), policy challenges to addressing conflict minerals (Fenwick 30 August 2012), and the effect of ongoing efforts (Bafilemba, Mueller, and Lezhnev June 2014). The reports frequently cite the UN GoE, as well as Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, Congolese civil society groups,[4] and other credible experts.
III.C.2. An Indirect PC Strategy
PC was a key element of Enough’s campaign. Many of their communications mention “consumer pressure” as the mechanism compelling companies to act. For instance, Jonathan Hutson at Enough has said: “Apple is claiming that their products don’t contain conflict minerals because their suppliers say so. People are saying that answer is not good enough. That’s why there’s this grass-roots movement, so that we as consumers can choose to buy conflict free.” (cited in Kristof 30 June 2010). In 2009 another Enough representative said: “As long as we don’t change the way we go about purchasing these things economic incentives will override [the need for supply chain transparency]” (David Sullivan, cited in ISI Emerging Markets Africawire 22 July 2009). Moreover, Enough’s reports and rankings point responsible consumers to certain companies instead of others. It has also asked consumers to tell industry leaders to act on conflict minerals, for instance through its Change the Equation for Congo five-day social media campaign that targeted each of Apple, Nintendo, Intel, BlackBerry, and Dell for one day (Take Part 9 December 2015).
However, Enough largely relied on local activist groups to undertake direct PPAs. Enough has supported the mobilization of these PC campaigns. Recall the RHC campaign discussed above. Through RHC Enough has eight DRC partners, including advocacy networks and service provider charities. Enough also has twenty American and international partners through RHC, including major international NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, and Amnesty International. Enough’s Conflict-free Cities initiative, which is a component of RHC, encourages activists to ask their city governments to pass resolutions committing to insist upon conflict-free standards in their major purchasing contracts. Conflict-free resolutions have been passed in five American cities and Kingston-Upon-Hull, which is in the UK (Enough 26 August 2015).
The Conflict-free Campus Initiative (CFCI) is another project nested within RHC. Through CFCI Enough supports groups at universities and high schools – primarily in the US and Canada but also elsewhere – that are working to eliminate conflict minerals on their campuses.[5] Enough provides student groups with informational resources, guidance, and a web platform through which to promote calls for action (i.e. petitions and letter-writing campaigns). Enough also holds training sessions and conferences, bi-weekly calls with their Coordinator, and virtual sessions in which student groups could interact (Callaway 12 May 2016). CFCI actions often seek to change university policies,[6] but also involve awareness raising and actions targeted at governments and companies. For instance, Conflict-free Duke sent a video message to Apple CEO Tim Cook (Jones 27 January 2012). In another case activists flooded Intel’s Facebook page calling on it to support US conflict minerals legislation (Kristof 29 June 2010).
Activists have also circulated online petitions echoing Enough’s suggested advocacy goals, for example the change.org petition by Congolese activist Delly Mawazo Sesete that called on Apple to make a conflict-free product that includes minerals from DRC.[7]
III.D. Hybrid and Private Initiatives
Enough promoted company engagement in initiatives to encourage in-region conflict-free minerals, although it has also criticized these same initiatives for their failings. Specifically, the following industry initiatives have been mentioned in Enough’s communications: the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI) and its Conflict-Free Smelter (CFS) program; the ITRI Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi); the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) certification program; and capacity building programs.
III.D.1. Downstream Certification: the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative
The EICC and GeSI have worked together on conflict minerals through what became CFSI.[8] Initially known as the EICC-GeSI Extractives Working Group, this group was replaced by CFSI in 2013. CFSI puts systems in place so that downstream producers can influence their suppliers to be conflict-free. It has created a standardized reporting template, which helps downstream producers to gain information about its suppliers. The current version of the reporting template is tailored to the US conflict minerals law. CFSI also publishes lists of active and compliant smelters and refiners,[9] based on CFS. CFS was developed by EICC-GeSI in 2009. It is a third-party audited system for validating compliance with protocols developed to meet international standards on due diligence for conflict minerals (CFSI 16 July 2012). To be CFS-certified the smelter must show documentation that can determine with reasonable confidence that the minerals it processed originated from DRC conflict-free sources (CFSI 12 September 2015). Enough encouraged participation in EICC-GeSI as part of its campaign (Enough December 2010). However, it also pressed the group to take meaningful action (Enough Project December 2010). “We were concerned that this industry-wide approach allowed companies who were not interested in taking action to hide behind the association” (Sullivan 1 December 2015).
III.D.2. Upstream Certification: the ITRI Supply Chain Initiative
iTSCi is a third-party audited upstream certification system operating in DRC and Rwanda. It is a system for tracing the origin of 3T minerals from mine to smelter that was started in 2009 by ITRI, which is a tin industry organization (Van der Linde 3 February 2011). iTSCi initially certified only tin mines but has since expanded to include tantalum and tungsten mines as well. The program operates at around 1000 mine sites in Burundi, Rwanda, and DRC (ITRI n.d.). Enough has encouraged the creation and expansion of iTSCi (Lezhnev and Bafilemba 13 March 2014) but has also pressed for the system to be improved, for instance by eliminating loopholes and improving transparency (Bafilemba, Lezhnev, and Zingg-Wimmer August 2012).
III.D.3. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICGLR is an international organization comprised of twelve Central African member states. It was created in 2000 to improve peace and security in the region (ICGLR n.d.). ICGLR began planning a certification system for conflict-free minerals in 2010 (Partnership Africa Canada June 2012). The ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism addresses all four 3TGs. It is an upstream system with four components: mine inspections and traceability; an information database; audits; and independent monitoring. The first ICGLR certificate was issued in November 2013 in Rwanda. However, this was before all components of the program were in place. As Enough has pointed out, the Audit Committee and Independent Mineral Chain Auditor had not been appointed (Hall and Lezhnev November 2013). Enough has asked US envoys to work with ICGLR to finalize that organization’s certification process (de Koning and the Enough Project October 2013; Hall and Lezhnev November 2013). While Enough supports ICGLR, it has continued to stress that the framework needs to improve (Bafilemba, Mueller, and Lezhev June 2014).
III.D.4. Capacity-building Initiatives
Several capacity-building initiatives have developed to support conflict-free minerals in the GLR since 2008. Some notable examples include: the Public-Private Alliance on Responsible Minerals Trade (PPARMT), Solutions for Hope (SfH), and the Conflict-Free Tin Initiative (CFTI). Enough has encouraged participation in these initiatives in its campaign communications.
PPARMT is a multi-sectoral initiative with participation from INGOs, USAID and the State Department, the ICGLR, and companies (including electronics companies). It was launched in 2011 and formalized in a 2012 memorandum of understanding (PPARMT August 2012). PPARMT provides funding and coordination support to organizations working within the GLR to promote conflict-free capacity for industry, civil society, and governments (Resolv 2016). Enough is a participant in PPARMT and has encouraged membership in PPARMT (Lezhnev and Hellmuth August 2011, 2012; Lezhnev and Sullivan May 2011; de Koning and the Enough Project October 2013).
SfH was initiated by Motorola Solutions in 2011. The purpose is to create and test a program of responsible sourcing from the DRC. Under the thinking that setting up conflict-free infrastructure required defined end-users, SfH defined a set of rules and players to demonstrate that companies could source conflict-free tantalum from DRC while meeting due diligence requirements (RESOLVE 30 October 2014; Motorola Solutions 2012). In 2014 the Motorola Solutions Foundation announced a grant to RESOLVE to help expand SfH within DRC and in surrounding countries (Motorola Solutions 28 October 2014). Enough has supported this initiative, pointing out its benefits for Congolese miners (Bafilemba, Mueller, and Lezhnev June 2014: 17; Enough 13 March 2014).
CFTI began in 2012 as a partnership between Philips and the Netherlands (Philips updated 2016). Similar to SfH, CFTI sought to demonstrate that it was possible to source conflict-free tin from DRC (RESOLVE 2014).[10] It concluded in 2014. Upon the establishment of CFTI, Enough said: “this joint initiative [CFTI] is showing leadership by sourcing minerals from a conflict-free mine in eastern Congo” (Sasha Lezhnev, cited in RESOLVE 18 September 2012). However, Enough has been careful to stress that pilot initiatives like CFTI are insufficient by themselves. “This project [CFTI] is a positive step but should be followed up with a permanent independent monitoring system to ensure no conflict minerals leak into the system” (Enough 26 February 2013).
III.E. Public Politics
As it was pursuing a PC campaign, Enough was also involved with public politics at several levels. Domestically, Enough has advocated for conflict minerals legislation in the US and elsewhere. It has also advocated for the US government to use its foreign policy tools, including development funding, to address the problem of conflict minerals. Internationally, Enough has participated in processes at the United Nations, the OECD, and ICGLR, as well as other lower profile multi-stakeholder initiatives involving public actors. Throughout, Enough has connected its private and public political actions by encouraging companies to participate in public political processes. This section discusses Enough’s involvement with public policy on conflict minerals.
III.E.1. The OECD Due Diligence Guidance
The OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (OECD DDG) was issued in March 2011 and endorsed by the OECD in May 2011. It defines an approach to implementing due diligence for conflict minerals (OECD January 2013), and is a reference point for international efforts to curtail the trade in conflict minerals. The OECD DDG was developed through a multi-stakeholder process engaging governments, industry, civil society, and the United Nations. Following the endorsement of the OECD DDG Enough partnered with other human rights NGOs to call for companies to begin implementing these standards (Enough 27 May 2011).
III.E.2. The Dodd-Frank Act Conflict Minerals Rule
A major milestone was achieved when the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) was passed in 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act included a conflict minerals provision, s.1502, which required companies that use 3TG minerals in production to report on its due diligence practices publicly to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Enough had advocated for the creation of this provision by lobbying government officials and producing research and analysis on why the law would be useful. In addition to these tactics of “public politics”, Enough encouraged major electronics producers to publicly support the conflict minerals provision through statements of support. Intel, for instance, was targeted on its Facebook page for failing to publicly support the rule (Rogoway 26 June 2010). Enough has been explicit about the connection between its public advocacy on Dodd-Frank Act s.1502 and its PPA: “Dodd-Frank has been necessary to bring in the over 1,000 companies with weaker leadership and which are not as sensitive to consumer pressure” (Bafilemba, Mueller, and Lezhnev June 2014: 7).
After the rule was established in law Enough again engaged in both public and private politics to ensure the implementation of the rule. The SEC received “some 13,000 letters urging it to promptly adopt this rule” (Business Daily 10 January 2014) due to activist mobilization. As to private politics: after the Dodd-Frank Act was passed there was initially some debate about how s.1502 would be implemented. Amid this debate Enough continued to call on companies to speak in support of s.1502 and to participate in policy processes about how to implement the provision (Enough 27 June 2012).
In June 2012, Enough and an amalgam of human rights groups called on companies to publicly express support for s.1502 and against the US Chamber of Commerce, which was suing the SEC. PC was invoked as an argument in that debate, notably by the Executive Director of Jewish World Watch. He said:
Consumers have made it plain to companies that they want conflict-free products to come to market, and stand ready to reward those companies that are doing their utmost to achieve that goal. […] Those same consumers will be sorely disappointed to learn that otherwise proactive companies are at the same time hedging their bets by quietly supporting the Chamber. (Fred Kramer, cited by Global Witness 27 June 2012).
In August 2012, the SEC introduced its ruling implementing s.1502 (SEC 22 August 2012). While the SEC rule provided some clarity as to the requirements of s.1502 companies retained considerable leeway – first, because the requirements were largely procedural and, second, because there were some aspects that remained open for interpretation. Enough sought to shape how companies responded to these new legislative requirements. Specifically, Enough and the Responsible Sourcing Network (RSN) co-produced a report on the content that they expected to see in companies’ disclosures:
SRIs [socially responsible investors] and NGOs will look poorly upon issuers that postpone robust reporting or file a report that simply ticks a box. Conversely, stakeholders will publicly acknowledge issuers that actively demonstrate efforts to address the issue, provide transparent procedures and results, and make progress over time […] the extent to which an issuer takes a holistic approach to supporting a clean minerals trade in the DRC will be noted and rewarded. (Fenwick and Jurewicz September 2013: 2)
Since its implementation Dodd-Frank Act s.1502 has been criticized because the disclosures do not contain enough information to determine which companies are acting responsibly and for the effect that the legislation has had on mining in the GLR (Karubanga 22 November 2015). Reform of the conflict minerals provision is currently being considered (Just Means 8 November 2016), particularly in light of the low number, about five percent, of reporting companies that have been able (or willing) to meet the requirements (King 5 June 2014).
III.E.3. Other Conflict Minerals Legislation
The United States is the only country outside of the GLR to have enacted a law requiring disclosure of conflict mineral due diligence. However, legislation has been debated in both the European Union (EU) and Canada.
The EU began work on conflict minerals legislation in 2013, but as yet the process is ongoing. Enough signed, with 57 other civil society organizations, a position paper calling on the European Commission (EC) to adopt mandatory legislation (Civil Society Position Paper 16 September 2013). In May 2015, the European Parliament (EP) voted to reject the EC’s proposal of a voluntary self-certification system, instead requesting that the regulation be mandatory (20 May 2015). After some discussion, the EP’s negotiators reached a provisional agreement with the Council of the EU on mandatory reporting for upstream companies and voluntary disclosures for downstream companies (Gardner 16 June 2016). New draft regulation has yet to be ratified by the EP (EurActiv 8 November 2016).
Canada has introduced two draft conflict minerals bills. However, both were bills introduced by an opposition Member of Parliament (MP), which are exceedingly unlikely to pass. In 2010 then-MP Paul Dewar, the New Democratic Party’s foreign affairs critic, tabled Bill C-571 (Klaszus 13 December 2010). Bill C-571 was not voted on due to an election. Paul Dewar reintroduced the legislation as Bill C-486 in March 2013. It failed on 24 September 2014. Enough promoted Bill C-486 and an affiliated petition through CFCI (Callaway 16 September 2014; Conflict-Free Campus Initiative 3 May 2013), and indirectly by promoting the activities of STAND Canada and other advocacy organizations participating in the Just Minerals Campaign. It had previously called on Research in Motion to publicly support Bill C-571 (Enough Project December 2010).
III.E.4. Traditional Diplomatic Tools
Enough has also asked the US government to exercise traditional diplomatic tools to address the problem of conflict minerals, for instance through pressing governments in the GLR or introducing UNSC sanctions (de Koning and the Enough Project October 2013; Hall and Lezhnev November 2013; Bafilemba and Lezhnev April 2015). This area of public political campaigning tended not to also include a private politics component.
III.F. Company Responses
This section discusses the responses of electronics companies. It is organized in accordance with Enough’s four categorizations of companies: early leaders, late leaders, middle performers, and laggards.
III.F.1. The Early Leaders
The “early leaders” are those that Enough recognized in both its 2010 and 2012 company rankings as leading industry efforts: Intel, Hewlett-Packard (HP), Motorola Mobility, Motorola Solutions, Nokia, Microsoft, Dell, and Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). In particular, Intel and HP have consistently sought to be at the frontier of action on conflict minerals. As Sasha Lezhnev has said: “HP and Intel have gone above and beyond the call of duty” (Enough 16 August 2012).
Intel began to act on conflict minerals in 2009 by appointing Carolyn Duran to lead a conflict minerals team (Weekend Argus 1 June 2014). The company faced initial difficulty in tracing their supply chain due to lack of interest from smelters (Weekend Argus 1 June 2014). “A smelter’s decision to participate is primarily based on their customers’ demands. The end goal, which Intel has demonstrated, is getting the smelters convinced that participating in the program and being audited is good for their business” (Carolyn Duran, cited in Weekend Argus 1 June 2014). It took two years for Intel to begin seeing results (Weekend Argus 1 June 2014). Intel met with company representatives (Enough December 2010) and travelled to its suppliers. It has also provided financial support to smelters to pay for audits (King 5 June 2014). In January 2014 CEO Krzanich declared that Intel had made its processors conflict-free (Africa Review 10 January 2014), an achievement for which Enough praised the company (Callaway 1 June 2015). “We felt an obligation to implement changes in our supply chain” (CEO Brian Krzanich, cited in Africa Review 10 January 2014).
However, Enough and the activists that it supports have been willing to criticize Intel. For instance, in 2010 Intel reportedly opposed US conflict minerals legislation, although it never publicly took a position (Rogoway 26 June 2010). Activists flooded Intel’s Facebook page calling on it to act (Kristof 29 June 2010). Though Intel did not publicly support the creation of the conflict minerals provision, it did sign onto a 2012 multi-stakeholder letter on the legal challenge to the SEC’s rule. Intel has also been active in participating in global governance efforts. It co-chaired the EICC-GeSI Extractives Working Group; chaired the review committee for CFS; co-founded, with HP and General Electric, the Initial Audit Fund; and participated in PPARMT and SfH.
HP is the second company that Enough consistently pointed to as a leader in conflict minerals action. However, the approaches that these two companies have taken are somewhat different. While Intel broke ground through its conflict-free microprocessors, HP showed more consistent leadership in American public politics on conflict minerals. Both companies have been active participants in TBGIs.
HP is one of the front-runners in terms of achieving a conflict-free supply chain. The company has set the expectation that its suppliers obtain information on their supply chains and provide that information using CFSI’s reporting template (HP 19 July 2013, 26 May 2016). HP was one of the first three electronics companies to publish its list of smelters, with SanDisk in 2013 and behind Philips in 2012 (Hardy 15 April 2013). HP has not made as much progress as Apple with its smelters and refiners, but it is closer than most. As of April 2015, 59% (152) of the smelters and refiners in HP’s supply chain are CFS compliant, compared with 30% in January 2014 (HP 2016). “The smelters are the chokepoint. Once you locate them, you can start to pressure them to set a standard. […] It took a while to identify all of the smelters, but putting pressure on them is relatively easy.” (Tony Prophet, then-HP executive, cited in Hardy 15 April 2013). As with Intel, HP has found that in-person visits have been the best way to convince smelters to participate in conflict-free programs. HP’s head of conflict-minerals compliance, Jay Celorie, has said: “A smelter’s decision to participate is primarily based on their customers’ demands,” (cited in King 5 June 2014).
Compared with Intel, HP was a more consistent public ally to conflict-free activists that sought US legislation. The company took a stance in favor of Dodd-Frank Act s.1502, and Enough has rewarded this decision in its communications (Hall 22 August 2011). HP also signed onto the 2012 multi-stakeholder letter. However, as Global Witness publicly pointed out, HP’s ties to the US Chamber of Commerce – which sued the SEC over the conflict minerals rule – allow for the potential that the company has tried to “have it both ways” (Global Witness May 2012). In its reply to Global Witness, HP reiterated its public support for the legislation (HP 22 May 2012).
Like Intel, HP has been involved in industry and multi-stakeholder initiatives to establish regulation and governance infrastructure on conflict minerals. HP co-chaired the EICC-GeSI Extractives Working Group; participated in the ICGLR-OECD-UN GoE annual Forum on Responsible Mineral Supply Chains; disclosed its participation in an OECD DDG implementation pilot; is on the governance committee of PPARMT; has, according to Enough, been the “most active participant in a diplomacy working group” on DRC (according to Lezhnev and Hellmuth August 2012: 5); and engages with SfH and CFTI.
Aside from HP and Intel, there are five other companies that Enough has cited as industry leaders from the early stages of the campaign: Motorola,[11] Nokia, Dell, Microsoft, and AMD. These companies have taken individual steps to address their supply chains; have supported human rights groups on public policy to do with conflict minerals; and have engaged in efforts to develop conflict-free governance both in and out of region.
Early leaders have accepted a duty to be active with suppliers to ensure that they are sourcing conflict-free minerals. “[We] have an obligation to do our part, which we fully accept.” (Motorola, cited in Enough December 2010). In 2009 Intel, HP, Dell, and Motorola organized a multi-industry forum to help companies seeking to map their supply chains and implement conflict-free policies (Arbogast 25 August 2009). The early leaders have followed the recognition of responsibility with policies and supply chain mapping.
Several of the early leaders have pioneered initiatives to support systems for regulating conflict minerals in supply chains or building capacity for in-region conflict-free minerals. Motorola Solutions, for instance, created SfH. Early leaders have also been actively involved in the implementation of the OECD DDG, for example by attending the annual ICGLR-OECD-UN GoE Forum. Motorola Solutions’ Mike Loch has given presentations at this forum on several occasions.
Regarding public politics, Microsoft, AMD, and Dell have also supported conflict minerals legislation. Although AMD was not included in Enough’s initial rankings due to its size, it received an honorable mention in the accompanying report because it had leant its voice in support of conflict minerals legislation (Enough December 2010). Microsoft, AMD, Dell, and Motorola Solutions issued statements and/or signed onto a multi-stakeholder letter criticizing the US Chamber of Commerce lawsuit against the SEC. Microsoft has been particularly vocal on conflict minerals legislation. In reply to Global Witness’ May 2012 letter questioning whether companies were trying to “have it both ways” (discussed above), Microsoft was one of few electronics companies to generate a formal reply. In it, Sr. Director of Corporate Citizenship Dan Bross said:
We have publicly supported adoption of these [SEC] regulations, and indeed we have joined human rights advocates in a public comment letter urging the SEC to adopt the regulations without delay. […] On other issues, notably climate change and conflict minerals, we are opposed to the Chamber’s positions and do not fund or support their work. (Bross 22 May 2012).
AMD has been perhaps the most active company in supporting human rights organizations in their public political actions on conflict minerals. AMD and Enough co-chaired a multi-stakeholder policy and diplomacy working group that delivered consensus policy positions to the SEC (AMD 2011). The company also met with Enough and US State Department officials to emphasize the need for government support of in-region sourcing (AMD 2011).
III.F.2. The Late Leaders
The “late leaders” were identified only in Enough’s 2012 report as taking significant efforts to combat conflict minerals: SanDisk, Philips, RIM, Acer, Apple, and Panasonic. In most cases these companies significantly improved their practices between 2010 and 2012, according to Enough.
The companies in this category have participated in initiatives to strengthen governance systems and in-region conflict-free programs. Some, notably Philips, also supported advocacy for conflict minerals legislation. Additionally, the late leading companies have made considerable strides in their supply chain policies, beginning by studying their supply chains. Philips was the first company to publish the names of its smelters and to initiate audits of its suppliers that use the 3TG minerals (Lezhnev and Hellmuth August 2012). SanDisk, Acer, Panasonic, and Apple have since followed suit.
Unlike companies that have taken the lead on capacity-building initiatives and in public lobbying, Apple has focused its energy on its supplier relations. Recently Apple has taken a particularly robust approach to removing conflict from its supply chain. “[W]e believe that participation in third-party audit programs alone is not enough. Ongoing engagement is critical, because some smelters that have completed third-party audits have minerals that are supplied by mines allegedly involved with armed groups.” (Apple 2016: 13) In 2014 the company imposed a deadline requiring its suppliers to become compliant by the end of that year (Apple 2015). As of December 2015, Apple reports that all of its 242 smelters and refiners for the 3TG minerals are subject to third-party audits, an increase from 88% at the end of 2014 and 44% at the end of 2013 (Chasan 30 March 2016; Apple 2016). This strategy has earned Apple praise from Enough and other human rights groups. Enough rewarded Apple for turning around its approach in 2013 (Lezhnev 15 February 2013). Praise accelerated in 2016 (Oboth 11 April 2016). For example, Sasha Lezhnev said:
Apple's new supplier report is a model for how companies should be addressing conflict minerals. Apple's tough love with its suppliers is critical to solving the problem of deadly conflict minerals -- it offered assistance to suppliers but then took the difficult step of cutting out those who were unwilling to undergo an audit. Firm but fair follow-through by tech and other companies with their suppliers is a key step that's needed to cut off global markets for conflict minerals (Enough 31 March 2016).
III.F.3. The Middle Performers and Laggards
The “middle performers” were identified neither as leaders nor laggards by Enough in 2012: IBM, Sony, LG, Samsung, Toshiba, and Lenovo. These companies generally have not supported human rights groups in their public political engagement on conflict minerals and have not led industry or multi-stakeholder initiatives.[12] Middle performers have sometimes participated in groups like PPART. They may also have provided training or support for existing initiatives, for instance through IBM’s technology donation to iTSCi (Chegar 2012). More often, however, these middle performing companies have focused on internal activities. Some, such as Toshiba, have policies requiring all suppliers to work with the company in procuring conflict-free minerals (Toshiba 2016). Others, like LG, have mapped and identified the smelters in their supply chain (LG 2016). The middle performing companies have received little attention in Enough communications, aside from the rankings themselves.
The “laggards” have received a bit more attention from Enough. Laggards are those companies that Enough criticized for having taken the least significant steps in addressing conflict minerals: Canon, Nikon, Sharp, HTC, and Nintendo. These companies have done nothing or very little to address conflict minerals. For instance, after the 2012 rankings came out Nintendo released a statement in which it referred to its corporate social responsibility (CSR) procurement policy. Enough responded strongly to this statement:
Nintendo's statement is a meaningless piece of paper without concrete steps behind it, because suppliers don't know where their minerals come from. It should join the electronics industry audit program for conflict-free smelters, and require its suppliers to use only conflict-free smelters. Without that bare minimum, Nintendo is only putting a fig leaf over serious issues of war and slavery (Sasha Lezhnev, cited in Crecente 12 September 2012).
In September 2012 Walk Free protested Nintendo’s New York Wii U event (Crecente 12 September 2012). However, Nintendo’s CSR Procurement Policies still do not say anything about conflict minerals (Nintendo 2016).
III.G. Discussion
Enough never launched a boycott. Instead, its communications steered consumers toward some electronics companies rather than others. In addition to being potentially harmful given the complexity of the problem, a specific boycott call appears to have been unnecessary in this case. After all, “you don’t need to run a boycott to get big brand names on the run; everyone knows what’s on the table. […The Enough Project’s] plan is that just naming and shaming will ratchet up the pressure, and in turn these companies will lean on the smelting operations that supply the minerals they use.” (Bunting 13 December 2010). While not a boycott – campaigners never explicitly called for users to stop purchasing (Sterling 27 February 2011) – Enough did rely on PC as a source of pressure throughout. An interesting dynamic of this has been the use of “name and shame” tactics to induce smelter participation in the third-party audits (Chasan 30 March 2016), coupled with the use of praise to reward companies that acted.
Enough’s practice of rewarding leaders and shaming laggards seems to be part of a strategy to motivate actors to continually push the frontier of action. This strategy is perhaps why experts have noted that “stakeholders from civil society and the private sector have shown willingness to talk and work together” on conflict minerals, in contrast to some other social and environmental issues (Michelle de Cordova, cited in Marlow 13 March 2012). Enough has participated in industry efforts – such as the EICC-GeSI Extractives Working Group – and at times partnered with companies to lobby for legislative change. Enough’s model of research and indirect activism may be another reason that it has been able to collaborate to the extent that it has with companies and government actors. This collaborative dynamic is especially important for a complex global challenge like conflict minerals, where the absence of governance, at the state and international level, is a primary obstacle. Although certainly the conflict minerals movement has had its setbacks and troubles, establishing a collaborative dynamic has resulted in considerable progress since 2007. New modes of governance, such as CFS, US conflict minerals disclosure, iTSCi, and the ICGLR-OECD-UN GoE forum, have been created. Although not an unambiguous success, there is some evidence that the link between conflict and minerals has been severed, at least for the 3Ts, and that company behavior has mattered (Simonson 27 July 2016).
Enough also encouraged the development of in-region conflict-free certification and capacity-building programs, such as CFS, SfH, CFTI, and PPARMT. This approach was perhaps crafted to address criticism that the conflict minerals movement had resulted in an effective mineral boycott in the region, resulting in negative socio-economic effects (Radley 19 April 2016; Meger 31 August 2012; Marlow 13 March 2012). Enough’s approach also suggests a keen understanding of the global nature of the problem and the need to build regulatory systems that shape global value chains. National and international standards like Dodd-Frank s. 1502 and the OECD DDG are components of such systems, but equally important are the norms of buyer-supplier relationships and the use of CSR supports to build local capacity. Without all three of these components developing simultaneously, companies would be able to pass the buck to other actors more defensibly.
Of course, the tripartite nature of the governance challenge requires a lot from companies, which increases the cost to participation. Enough’s approach thus appears to have centered on emboldening “leading” companies to act, by providing a basis for these companies to differentiate themselves. Companies recognized as “leaders” may have been more receptive to taking public stances on upcoming legislation, thus providing Enough leverage in its public politics. Moreover, these “leading” companies often made statements reinforcing their status and, in doing so, reaffirmed expected “good practice” on conflict minerals as it existed at a given time. The self-congratulatory statements of leading companies then made it easier for Enough to claim that progress is possible and companies simply are insufficiently committed.
As the literature predicts, Enough appears to have recognized that it would be all but impossible to target less visible companies. Instead of including these companies in its efforts directly Enough has relied on two mechanisms: legislation and changes in supplier practices through demand from the (targeted) visible firms. Legislation – the “specter of regulation” – is often considered as part of the firm’s calculus in responding to PC campaigns. However, the role of buyer-supplier relations (Locke 2013) is quite often not accommodated for in boycott-buycott studies. We know from the Enough campaign that consumer pressure was essential in prompting not only the decision of electronics firms to ask suppliers to adopt certification programs, but also in the response of smelters themselves. For instance, Malaysia Smelting in Kuala Lumpur is the world’s third-largest producer of tin. It participates in CFS and pays for annual third-party audits with funding from Intel. Its CEO, Chua Cheong Yong, has cited consumer pressure as its reason for acting: “If consumers stop buying materials from the Congo, then people like us have to disengage because we cannot put ourselves in a position where people won’t buy from us” (cited in King 5 June 2014).
Studying a “boycott” or “buycott” campaign on conflict minerals misses all of these aspects of the Enough campaign – most obviously because it was a private political campaign that used PC but it was not a boycott per se. Moreover, a traditional boycott-buycott study would code as separate consumer actions that were in fact part of the broader Enough campaign. This is true, first, in regards to the different activist campaigns that Enough supported through its indirect PC approach. Second, this case shows that the link between private and public political action is essential in complex global challenges like conflict minerals.
IV. The Iterative Dynamics of PC Campaigns
The conflict minerals case study demonstrates that existing studies of PC campaigns, which take as their unit of analysis individual boycott or buycott campaigns, are deficient in several respects: PC campaigns are iterative; inter-firm dynamics are critical to understanding how PC campaigns unfold; and public politics matter.
First, PC campaigns are iterative. Campaigner demands evolved over time in the case study, leading to communication dynamics in which firms were differentiated by their level (and type) of progress and where Enough simultaneously punished some firms in its communications while rewarding others. This suggests that existing theoretical approaches, which view boycott and buycott campaigns as discrete events, obscure the inter-temporal and inter-firm dynamics that are critical to understanding advocacy organizations’ (and firms’) decisions.
An important implication of viewing PC as iterative is how this shapes the justification of advocacy organizations’ demands. As practice develops throughout an iterated PC campaign, the advocacy group need no longer exclusively appeal to what is morally right in an abstract sense. Instead, advocates can justify their demands through appealing to industry norms or frame their role as holding companies accountable to commitments that they have already made. In the Enough Project’s conflict minerals campaign certain practices – like mapping the firm’s supply chain, asking suppliers to demonstrate due diligence, and buying CFS-certified minerals – came to be viewed as expected conduct for responsible electronics companies. In addition to the regularization of certain practices across the industry, public commitments by firms about their own conduct can have an effect. An example outside of the present case is the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and PC targeting Chevron and British Petroleum (Hofferberth 2011). In these instances, what results may be (in a different sense than Gjølberg (2011) and Buhman (2010) intended) the “emergent juridification” of CSR, as a sense of “binding-ness” is established – that is, there is a shared sense of obligation on which campaigners draw as a basis for future campaigns. Viewing PC campaigns as iterative helps to shed light on the communication dynamics by which a sense of binding-ness is developed – how certain practices come to be viewed as obligatory or required. It also has the potential to connect PPAs to the socialization of business leaders that participate in TBGIs, which may affect corporate strategy in a lasting sense, as suggested by van der Ven (2014).
Viewing PC campaigns as iterative allows us to devote attention to another aspect of private politics: the influence of inter-firm dynamics. As the case illustrates, advocacy groups strategically differentiate companies from one another – designating some as “pioneers” or “leaders” and others as “laggards” – and “leading” firms reinforce this dynamic through self-congratulatory rhetoric and new commitments. Advocacy organizations can also use this dynamic to move the frontier of progress on an issue, by offering new opportunities for “leaders” to consolidate their positions and criticizing leaders that rest on their laurels. Firms also collaborate in response to PC campaigns through industry standards, projects, and advocacy stances. The configuration of these collaborations was not uniform across the industry, as a “greenwashing” perspective might anticipate. Instead, the incidences of collaboration were greatest for “leading” firms, suggesting that this differentiated identity may have played a role in shaping industry dynamics. Attention to the role and structure of “coopetition” (CBN 25 August 2014) in response to PC campaigns would shed further light on the causes and consequences of this phenomenon. In particular, it implies that PPAs may influence whether firms act together to limit their environmental and social commitments or whether “coopetition” dynamics strengthen the content of these commitments.
Another important point that this case study does not explore is the effect of multiple, in some cases simultaneous, PC campaigns on firm strategies. For instance, it is worth considering whether and how the ongoing scandal involving suicides and labor abuses at Apple supplier Foxconn’s factories influenced its approach to conflict minerals (Bilton 18 December 2014; Neate 29 July 2013; Dou 21 August 2016). PC campaigns are iterated, but so are company CSR policies. What is unclear is whether multiple scandals have a zero-sum or ratcheting up effect, and under which circumstances. What, if any, are the spillover effects of PC campaigns?
Finally, public politics are important for understanding how PC campaigns influence complex global challenges like conflict minerals. The Enough Project’s conflict minerals campaign illustrates the link between public and private political actions at the domestic and global levels. Enough explicitly engaged electronics companies as partners in lobbying government, establishing working groups to determine how to regulate conflict mineral due diligence, and in developing capacity-building initiatives to respond to the development challenge embedded within the problem of conflict minerals. This reflects another way in which PC campaigns are iterative. As the communicative dynamic evolves over time it results not only in negotiated “agreement” on the roles and responsibilities of companies in regulating the problem, but also in the implementation of governance systems and modalities that make these responsibilities feasible. This is essential for PC when it addresses a global challenge precisely because these campaigns emerge in response to the reality of there being no single competent authority able to regulate the problem.
Furthermore, the conflict minerals case affirms the important role of the state in shaping the contours of global PC campaigns. This is in line with studies that stress the embeddedness of private governance within state regulatory systems (i.e. Lister 2011). The linkage of public and private politics in Enough’s campaign, particularly regarding US conflict minerals legislation, illustrates the looming relevance of the state even in a case where the absence of sovereignty was at the heart of the governance challenge. While PC was used throughout Enough’s campaign to influence buyer-supplier norms, Enough and other advocacy groups also relied on US legislation to drive action of a broader swathe of firms. Two interesting points arise from this observation. First, we have seen the transnationalization of American law emerge as a leverage point for Enough – which tacitly acknowledged that the coercive power of the state was necessary to shape compliance across all industries using 3TGs. That is, US requirements constituted an attempt to build transnational authority for conflict minerals regulation by making SEC reporting companies responsible for the entire value chain. While the s.1502 experiment may soon end, it offers a glimpse of how the transnationalization of state authority is taking place in response to globalization. Second, the conflict minerals case illustrates how PC is an effective, albeit indirect, tactic of public politics. Studies have found that companies, and especially big companies, have greater access to the state than NGOs (Pekkanen and Smith 2014). Insofar as this is true, a strategy of rewarding leading firms can be interpreted as a tool of public politics. This is true, obviously, when firms make statements about legislation, but also in terms of the effect that firm differentiation may have on the stances that firms then take in undisclosed discussions with government, if firms internalize their position as a “responsible” minerals user.
The Enough Project’s conflict minerals campaign was not a boycott or buycott, but it did involve PC. This case highlights several important aspects of global advocacy campaigns that involve PC. First, it demonstrates the iterative nature of PC tactics, which shape norms of responsibility and make possible firm differentiation. Second, it highlights the critical influence of inter-firm dynamics, including coopetition amongst major electronics producers. Third, it directs attention to the links between public and private politics at the domestic and global levels. These three dimensions are important for understanding the role of PC in constructing regulation across state boundaries and within them, especially where state capacity is lacking.
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Endnotes
[1] Specifically, large end-user firms with high brand awareness are most likely to be targeted by advocacy groups (i.e. Bartley and Child 2014). The global political economy literature also discusses inter-firm dynamics with respect to how end-user firms exert influence on their suppliers (i.e. Locke 2013), which is an important mechanism for changing business practices.
[2] For example, the text of the letter sent to Steve Jobs is available here: http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/globalministries/legacy_url/8922/Electronics-company-letter-Congo-minerals-final.pdf?1419971324.
[3] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Ycih_jMObQ.
[4] For example, Lezhnev and Sullivan (2011) drew attention to the Support Group for Traceability and Transparency in the Management of Natural Resources, which had just been created. Enough has also promoted a video series called “I Am Congo”, which depicts the lives of activists in DRC. See here: http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/apps/iamcongo/#intro.
[5] A list of schools participating in CFCI is available here: http://www.conflictfreecampus.org/schools.html.
[6] For instance, university pledges to ensure that computer and electronic equipment purchases are conflict free have been adopted by at least nineteen institutions (Schaffhauser 27 May 2015).
[7] The petition is available here: https://www.change.org/p/apple-make-a-conflict-free-product-that-includes-minerals-from-eastern-congo.
[8] EICC is an industry organization of electronics companies, was established in 2004 and currently has 110 members. It has developed a Code of Conduct, a set of standards on environmental and social issues pertaining to the electronics industry supply chain. GeSI, which was created in 2001, is a partnership of the information and communications technology sector on environmental and social issues. It primarily supports research and information on best practices.
[9] As of November 2016 there were 276 compliant smelters and refiners – tantalum (73), tin (50), tungsten (74), and gold (79). See here for the full lists: http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/conflict-free-smelter-refiner-lists/.
[10] A third such initiative not discussed in this paper is the KEMET Partnership for Social and Economic Sustainability.
[11] In 2011 Motorola split into Motorola Mobility and Motorola Solutions. Motorola Solutions has taken a more ambitious approach to conflict minerals than has Motorola Mobility.
[12] Sony is the exception to the latter of these. It led a partnership to get Japanese electronics companies more involved on conflict minerals, which resulted in a Japanese technology industry association signing a memorandum of understanding with EICC to participate in the smelter audit program (Rath 22 November 2012).
